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Domestic Structures and the 
Diversionary Use of Force* 
Ross A. Miller, Santa Clara University 
Theory: This paper reformulates diversionary theory to take into account he effect 
of domestic structures onthe propensity ofleaders to use foreign policy to manipu- 
late domestic politics. 
Hypotheses: The structure of domestic political institutions and levels of policy 
resources condition the willingness of leaders to use conflict involvement tomanip- 
ulate domestic audiences. 
Method: Probit analysis of 294 militarized interstate disputes during the period 
from 1955 to 1976. 
Results: Domestic structures have a significant effect on the propensity ofleaders 
to use foreign policy as a vehicle of their personal political ambitions. 
Introduction 
Explanations of national decisions to use force have traditionally ne- 
glected the possible contribution of domestic political processes or institu- 
tions. "Domestic political variables," as Levy (1988, 79) observes, "are 
not included in any of the leading theories of the causes of war; instead, 
they appear only in a number of isolated hypotheses and in some empirical 
studies that are generally atheoretical and noncumulative." One reason for 
this neglect is that realism, arguably the dominant heoretical tradition of 
those who study international conflict, asserts that the primary factors de- 
termining foreign policy are found at the systemic level, often indicated 
by the distribution of military and economic power (Morgenthau 1967; 
Waltz 1959, 1979).1 In the realist view the distribution of power imposes a 
*1 am most grateful to Randy Siverson, Bob Jackman, Scott Gartner, Lewis Snider, Letitia 
Lawson and Steve Nicholson for their comments on this paper. I also wish to thank the 
editor and the anonymous referees for their suggestions. The data utilized are derived from 
four sources: the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (Gochman and Maoz 1984), the 
Polity II data set (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989), Summers and Heston (1988), and the 
United Nations Statistical Yearbook (various years). Documentation necessary to replicate 
the analysis can be obtained from the author. This research was made possible by a grant 
from the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University ofCalifornia, San Diego. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the International 
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'Although classical realists do not altogether dismiss domestic political factors, they 
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structure that constrains foreign policy elites to such an extent hat domestic 
political considerations are relatively unimportant in shaping their policy 
choices. 
In recent years, however, the effect of domestic factors on state foreign 
policy has generated substantial research generally focused on two areas.2 
The first stems from the broadly based empirical finding that while democ- 
racies are just as war-prone asother types of states (Small and Singer 1976; 
Chan 1984; Weede 1984), they simply do not engage ach other in conflicts 
of sufficient severity to be counted as international wars (Maoz and Abdo- 
lali 1989). 
Second, and coinciding with the research on regime type and war, is 
a renewed interest in diversionary theory. In its simplest form, diversionary 
(or scapegoat) theory argues that leaders of nation-states u e foreign con- 
flict involvement todivert domestic attention from internal problems (see 
Blainey 1988 and Levy 1989 for critiques). While the initial exploratory 
analyses yielded few significant results (Rummel 1963; Tanter 1966; Wil- 
kenfeld 1972), recent studies using different research designs have found 
a modest link between leader popularity and the diversionary use of 
force (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 
1992). 
This paper seeks to expand our theoretical nd empirical knowledge 
of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy by speci- 
fying the relationships among domestic variables and their consequent ef- 
fects on foreign policy. In particular, I focus on the effect of domestic struc- 
tures and systemic forces on the response of leaders to military threats from 
abroad. Following a discussion of the interrelationships among domestic 
and international sources of foreign policy, I evaluate their explanatory 
power using a set of 294 militarized interstate disputes that occurred be- 
tween 1955 and 1976. 
Theoretical and Empirical Issues 
The contention that leaders use international conflict to divert attention 
from domestic political problems is hardly novel (see Haas and Whiting 
place an even stronger mphasis on systemic factors. According to Waltz (1959, 160): "Be- 
cause any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly beready either to counter 
force with force or to pay the cost of weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this 
view, imposed by the circumstances inwhich all states exist." 
2These studies include, among others, Bueno de Mesquita nd Lalman (1992), Gaubatz 
(1991), James and Oneal (1991), Maoz and Abdolali (1989), Maoz and Russett (1993), 
Morgan and Campbell (1991), Morgan and Bickers (1992), Ostrom and Job (1986), Russett 
(1987, 1990), and Siverson and Starr (1994). 
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1956; Wright 1965). Initial analyses of the relationship between domestic 
turmoil and the propensity ofstates to engage in international conflict con- 
cluded that he relationship s weak to nonexistent. Rummel (1963) found 
little relationship among nine indicators of domestic onflict and 13 indica- 
tors of foreign conflict; attempts to replicate Rummel's analysis using 
slightly different approaches reached similar conclusions (Tanter 1966; 
Haas 1968; Wilkenfeld 1972; Kegley, Richardson, and Richter 1978). 
Other studies found some evidence linking domestic political problems and 
the external use of force by controlling for governmental structure (Wilken- 
feld 1968; Zinnes and Wilkenfeld 1971), the degree of militarization f the 
state (Kegley, Richter, and Richardson 1978), and ethnic diversity (Ha- 
zelwood 1973). 
The general lack of support for diversionary theory found in these ear- 
lier studies is at odds with recent empirical work using different research. 
designs, which finds a relatively strong relationship between leader popu- 
larity and the political use of force. In one of the first studies in this genre, 
Ostrom and Job (1986) evaluated the relative ffect of systemic and domes- 
tic factors on the propensity ofU.S. presidents ouse military force abroad. 
Their results indicate that popularity levels have a stronger effect on the 
probability that a U.S. president will initiate the use of force than any of 
the international variables: When popularity levels fall below .43, "in the 
absence of other factors the president is unlikely to use force at all." But 
when popularity levels are between .43 and .58, "the president may use 
force in anticipation ofbeing able subsequently toregain some of his lost 
approval" (Ostrom and Job 1986, 558). In their eanalysis of Ostrom and 
Job, James and Oneal (1991, 307) conclude that "domestic political factors 
remain most consequential in the president's decision to use force short 
of war." Similarly, Morgan and Bickers (1992) examined the relationship 
between support for presidents within their uling coalitions and their pro- 
pensity to use military force. Their results uggest hat between 1953 and 
1976, American presidents were "more prone to initiate aggressive foreign 
policy actions when the president was faced with a loss of support among 
his partisans" (Morgan and Bickers 1992, 49). 
How can we account for the different conclusions drawn by the initial 
and the recent ests of diversionary theory? One explanation is that the 
relationship may be unique to the United States, or to those nations that 
share a particular trait of the United States. Russett (1990, 130-131), for 
example, found a significant relationship between changing economic on- 
ditions and the dispute behavior of major powers, but found no relationship 
for minor powers. Thus, the relationship between leader popularity and the 
diversionary use of force may be restricted tomajor powers. 
Alternatively, these results may reflect different research designs. The 
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newer studies all use time-series analyses of the United States, while the 
earlier studies employed cross-sectional designs that include a much larger 
number of nations, but generally cover a shorter time period. As Morgan 
and Bickers (1992, 34) contend, perhaps "the hypothesis requires a re- 
search design that is longitudinal, not cross-sectional." 
I address this puzzle in three ways. First, I argue that he inconsistencies 
found between the results of time-series and cross-sectional tests of diver- 
sionary theory are due to the way the theory is specified, and not simply 
a function of variations in research design. I respecify the relationship be- 
tween leader popularity and the political use of force to take into account 
cross-national differences indomestic structures. In my approach, the pro- 
pensity of leaders to use foreign policy to manipulate domestic audiences 
is conditioned by the structure of domestic political institutions and the 
level of policy resources available to leaders. Second, I control for the effect 
of system-level factors on the relationship between leader popularity and 
national decisions to use force. Finally, I evaluate the ability of the reformu- 
lated theory to account for the response of leaders to demands placed by 
other states that are backed with the threat, display or use of military force. 
Although the existing literature on diversionary theory focuses on the rela- 
tionship between leader popularity and the initiation of international con- 
flict, if the theory is generalizable beyond conflict initiation itshould pro- 
vide a reasonable guide for the reformulation presented below. 
Theoretical Reformulation 
A variety of theoretical specifications have been used in empirical eval- 
uations of diversionary theory. According to Morgan and Bickers (1992, 
28), the diversionary hypothesis has generally been treated as "a universal 
dictum of state behavior ather than as a partial explanation of some foreign 
policy decisions." My reformulation builds on the second idea, and makes 
three basic assumptions. First, I assume that leaders in power wish to main- 
tain power and that leaders need the support of others to do so.3 In some 
states this may involve a diverse coalition of interest groups and political 
parties, while in other states it may involve the support of the military and 
the bureaucracy, orsome other combination ofgroups. Whatever the partic- 
ular coalition, all leaders share one fundamental reality: their political fu- 
tures depend on the implementation of foreign and domestic policies that 
are viewed favorably by the group(s) whose support hey rely on. Thus, 
policy outcomes (What have you done for me lately?) play a critical role 
in determining the fate of regimes. Leaders are not altruists; the implemen- 
tation of policies that benefit supporters is a pragmatic approach to power 
3This section draws from Bueno de Mesquita nd Siverson (1993). 
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maintenance. The assumption that leaders in power wish to maintain power 
does not preclude leaders from pursuing other preferences; it simply states 
that the primary preference of leaders is to stay in power.4 
I further assume that all leaders can be removed from power. The mech- 
anisms for removing leaders vary: in some states regularly scheduled elec- 
tions offer groups a means of altering regimes, while in other states coups 
d'etat and assassinations are more commonly used. But all leaders, regard- 
less of the structure of domestic political institutions, can in one way or 
another be held accountable for their performance by the groups that help 
them acquire power. 
A final assumption isthat leaders base foreign policy decisions on do- 
mestic and international concerns (Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger 1992). In 
this vein, international politics is linkage politics: foreign policies are af- 
fected by domestic and international f ctors, and they may be intended to 
influence domestic and international audiences. For purposes of empirical 
evaluation, the systemic level is indicated by the level of hostility of the 
state that placed the demand and the relative power of the dispute partici- 
pants. These two variables represent the international context in which the 
dispute takes place. The domestic variables include the popularity of the 
leaders, the policy resources available to leaders, and the structure ofdo- 
mestic political institutions. These variables represent the willingness of 
leaders to employ diversionary tactics. The latter two domestic variables 
condition the effect of popularity level on the leader's response to threats 
from abroad. I discuss each variable in turn. 
System-level Variables 
Realists contend that he international system is the primary source of 
state foreign policies. To survive, states must respond to the policies and 
changing capabilities of the other states in the international system (Waltz 
1959, 1979). Studies by Leng and Wheeler (1979), Leng (1983), and Huth 
and Russett (1988) show that he bargaining strategies mployed by nations 
involved in a dispute influence the outcome of that dispute. The use of 
bullying strategies (i.e., those characterized by high levels of hostility) by 
either dispute participant is systematically related to the escalation of that 
dispute to war. Ostrom and Job (1986) and James and Oneal (1991) include 
in their analyses ameasure of the "level of international tension" between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Ostrom and Job (1986, 546) argue 
that, "the higher the existing tensions between the superpowers, the more 
likely it will be for the president to consider acting in a forceful manner." 
'Of course, I also assume that leaders act rationally. On this point, see Bueno de Mes- 
quita (1981), Jackman (1993), and Riker (1990). 
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Both studies conclude that he level of international tension has a significant 
effect on the probability that a U.S. president will initiate the use of force. 
This leads to: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The higher the level of hostility of the initiator, the 
higher the probability that leaders respond with force. 
A second factor emphasized by system theorists o explain interstate 
behavior is the relative capability of nation-states. According to realists 
such as Morgenthau (1967) and Waltz (1979), balances of power lead to 
peace, whereas imbalances of power lead to war. Balances of power reduce 
the probability of war because they reduce the possibility that either side 
can achieve victory if war occurs. The greater the level of preponderance, 
the higher the probability of victory for the stronger power, and therefore 
the higher the probability that the latter will initiate or escalate a dispute. 
On the other hand, theorists such as Organski (1968), Organski and 
Kugler (1980), and Gilpin (1981) contend that power preponderance leads 
to peace, while balances of power are associated with war. Power prepon- 
derance theories contend that leaders of relatively weak states are likely to 
cave in to the demands of their stronger counterparts and should be reluctant 
to press their demands against stronger states in order to avoid the possibil- 
ity of international conflict. As a consequence, disputes between and among 
equals are more likely to escalate than disputes characterized by large dif- 
ferences in capabilities, since it is under the former condition that both 
states believe they will prevail in a war. 
Siverson and Tennefoss (1984, 1061) assess the relative merits of the 
two contrasting theories. Their analysis of 255 dyadic conflicts between 
1816 and 1965 that had at least one major power participant indicates that 
conflicts among unequals were more likely to escalate than conflicts involv- 
ing states of approximately equal capabilities. Moul (1988, 242) has also 
examined this question, among the European great powers, from 1815 to 
1939, and concludes that "conflicts between approximately equal, nonsepa- 
rated great power opponents were much more likely to escalate to war than 
were conflicts between unequals." 
The balance of power and power preponderance schools suggest wo 
competing hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The greater the relative capability of the target, the 
higher the probability the target responds with force. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The more quivalent the relative capabilities of the initi- 
ator and the target, he higher the probability the target responds with 
force. 
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Domestic-level Variables 
Central to diversionary theory is the notion that leaders use foreign 
policy to manipulate domestic support. Changes in levels of support are 
therefore critical to predicting the probability that leaders will use diver- 
sionary tactics: the lower the level of support, he higher the probability hat 
leaders will engage in international conflict. Most versions of diversionary 
theory do not take into account factors that affect he willingness of leaders 
to use international conflict involvement tomanipulate their popularity. 
Two factors that I believe influence the propensity of leaders to resort o 
diversionary measures are the policy resources available to leaders and the 
structure of domestic political institutions. 
I argue that leaders facing declining levels of support prefer to imple- 
ment policies that address the cause of their decline to diversionary policies. 
Although empirical evidence xists that he diversionary use of force pro- 
duces a "rally around the flag effect" at home, this effect is short-lived 
(Mueller 1973; Brody 1984; Ostrom and Job 1986). Diversionary tactics 
are therefore, atbest, short-term remedies for declining levels of support. 
Moreover, diversionary policies carry with them the risk of escalation, and 
national involvement inwars can have dire consequences for the responsi- 
ble leaders (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992). Finally, diver- 
sionary measures do not address the source of leaders' declining support. 
Given a choice between using diversionary tactics and implementing poli- 
cies that remedy the cause of their decline, leaders hould prefer the latter, 
for the reasons advanced above. 
The capacity of governments to extract he necessary resources to im- 
plement policies that benefit supporters varies dramatically across states 
(Organski and Kugler 1980, 72). These differences have important implica- 
tions for the fate of regimes. According to Organski and Kugler (1980, 74), 
the "failure to impose and extract axes is one of the essential indicators 
of governmental incapacity to obtain and maintain support." Therefore, 
other things equal, the greater the capacity of leaders to extract resources, 
the lower the probability hey will resort o diversionary tactics to manipu- 
late domestic audiences.5 
5Low levels of national political capacity may produce regimes that are dependent on 
a relatively small number of individuals (e.g., a military regime). Even though a leader may 
have few resources available to affect his or her popularity levels, these resources may be 
sufficient tocorrect for the cause of the leader's decline, thereby removing the need to use 
diversionary tactics. To control for the effects of the size of the ruling coalition on the 
relationship between levels of policy resources and the propensity ofleaders to use diversion- 
ary tactics I include a measure of regime type in the model. Bollen (1990, 9) for example 
defines political democracy as "the extent o which the political power of the elites is mini- 
mized and that of the nonelites i maximized. By political power I am referring to the ability 
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A second domestic variable that I believe conditions the willingness 
of leaders to use diversionary tactics is the structure of domestic political 
institutions. Kant was perhaps the first o argue that regime type affects the 
foreign policy behavior of states: 
if ... the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide whether there 
should be war or not, nothing ismore natural than that hose who would have 
to decide to undergo all deprivations ofwar will very much hesitate to start 
such an evil game.6 
While most research indicates that democracies are just as war-prone as 
nondemocracies (Small and Singer 1976; Chan 1984; Weede 1984; Maoz 
and Abdolali 1989), Morgan and Campbell (1991) show that political insti- 
tutions affect the foreign policy behavior of leaders. They find that, for 
major powers, high levels of decisional constraints have a negative effect 
on the probability that a conflict will escalate to war (Morgan and Campbell 
1991, 210). Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) explore the 
question of whether democratic leaders have different expectations about 
the domestic political costs of using force than their autocratic ounterparts. 
After examining 707 dispute dyads, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992, 
155) conclude "the common and crucial assumption that democratic lead- 
ers anticipate, on average, higher domestic political costs for the use of 
force than do nondemocratic leaders is supported by the evidence." 
I propose that the structure of domestic political institutions influences 
the propensity of leaders to use conflict involvement o manipulate domes- 
tic audiences. Leaders are treated as rational politicians whose primary goal 
is to stay in power, but their willingness to use diversionary tactics is af- 
fected by the anticipated omestic political costs of their actions. All other 
things being equal, if autocratic leaders expect to incur fewer domestic 
political costs for the use of force, they should be more willing than their 
democratic counterparts to employ diversionary tactics.7 
[of elites] to control the national governing system." In this way, the level of autocracy can 
serve as a proxy for the size of the ruling coalition. 
6Kant, Immanuel. 1977. The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political 
Writings. Trans. C. Friedrich. New York: Modern Library, p. 438. Cited in Bueno de Mes- 
quita and Lalman (1992, 153). 
7Implicit in this argument is the assumption that he expected political benefit of diver- 
sionary behavior is the same for all leaders, regardless of regime type. As I noted above, 
the available empirical evidence indicates that he use of force produces a short-term rally 
around the flag effect for democratic leaders. However, systematic empirical evidence on 
the effect of the use of force on domestic support for autocratic leaders is lacking. Anecdotal 
evidence (such as the Falklands War) suggests that autocratic leaders expect domestic politi- 
cal benefits from the political use of force, but this does not give a precise comparison of 
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The above discussion suggests three additional hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Controlling for levels of policy resources and the struc- 
ture of domestic political institutions, the lower the popularity of lead- 
ers, the higher the probability they respond with force. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: The greater the level of policy resources available to 
leaders, the stronger the negative relationship between leader popular- 
ity and the probability that leaders respond with force. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: The higher the level of autocracy, the stronger the nega- 
tive relationship between leader popularity and the probability that 
leaders respond with force. 
Measures 
Leader response, the dependent variable, is based on a measure in- 
cluded in the Gochman and Maoz (1984) Militarized Interstate Dispute data 
set which indicates the highest level of hostility reached by the target of 
the demand during the dispute. Five possible responses are coded: (1) no 
codable action, (2) threat to use force, (3) display of force, (4) use of force, 
and (5) war. This variable represents a five-point, monotonic scale of in- 
creasing levels of hostility. 
In its original form, the Gochman-Maoz (1984) indicator could be used 
to test for a linear relationship between leader popularity and the use of 
force. As Morgan and Bickers (1992, 34) point out, however, "we should 
not expect a linear relationship between some measure of the amount of 
domestic political problems and the amount of foreign conflict." Instead, 
we expect the probability that a leader will employ diversionary tactics to 
increase as the popularity ofthat leader erodes. Thus, diversionary behavior 
is expected after a leader's popularity drops below a threshold. In this ap- 
proach, the degree to which the leader's popularity falls below the threshold 
does not influence the level of hostility of the target. I therefore use a nonlin- 
ear statistical model and a dichotomous dependent variable to evaluate the 
effects of leader popularity on the probability of the use of force. 
Target responses are coded 1 if the response involves the use of force 
leaders' expected utilities for the use of force. The empirical nalysis presented below bears 
on this question. If democratic leaders expect greater domestic political benefits from using 
diversionary tactics than autocratic leaders, and if they face higher domestic political costs 
for using force than their autocratic counterparts, here should be no appreciable difference 
between the propensity of democratic and autocratic leaders to use conflict to manipulate 
domestic audiences. 
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or war; and 0 for all responses that did not involve the use of force.8 The 
use of force is used as a cutoff or two reasons. First, as I mentioned earlier, 
theoretical nd empirical research by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
(1992) indicates that democratic leaders face higher domestic political costs 
for the use of force than leaders of autocracies. No existing research links 
domestic political costs with regime type at lower levels of hostility. Sec- 
ond, the distribution fthe Gochman-Maoz indicator is bimodal: level 1 
("no codable action") and level 4 ("use of force") account for 70.7% of 
all observations (31.29% and 39.46%, respectively) used in the analyses 
presented below. On the other hand, level 2 ("threat") and level 3 ("dis- 
play of force") account ogether for only 23.4% of the cases (6.8% and 
16.6%, respectively).9 
Initiator hostility levels is drawn directly from the Gochman-Maoz 
(1984) data set. The initiator's actions are coded on a scale that is identical 
to the one used to indicate the actions of the target. Hypothesis 1 proposes a
positive, monotonic relationship between hostility levels and the probability 
of the use of force. Therefore, incontrast to the method used to construct the 
dependent variable, it is unnecessary todichotomize initiator hostility levels. 
8I include wars in the construction fthe dependent variable because the Gochman and 
Maoz (1984) measure of hostility is coded as the highest level of hostility used during the 
entire dispute. The ex post nature of the indicator suggests that it is entirely possible that 
the dispute participants initially used low levels of violence, and that he conflict escalated 
as each responded to the actions of the other (e.g. conflict spiral). There is no ex ante reason 
to believe that a state pursing diversionary behavior will be more likely to acquiesce under 
these conditions than another type of state. To ensure that the inclusion of wars was not 
biasing my results, I estimated a separate set of models (identical to those presented below) 
that excluded those cases where the target responded with war. The results were virtually 
identical to the models presented in Table 1. 
9To investigate he robustness of my results, I reestimated the models presented below 
with a dependent variable coded as 0 for hostility levels 1 and 2 ("no codable action" and 
"the threat of force," respectively) and 1 for hostility levels 3 through 5 ("display of force," 
"use of force," and "war," respectively). Substantively, the results with this alternative 
coding rule were very similar to those obtained using the first coding rule. 
A second possible concern is selection bias. As Blainey (1988, 86) explains, "the spread 
of civil strife within a nation often resembled the death of a king; the royal funeral bells in 
the eighteenth century often had the same martial echoes as the bells that rang the curfew 
in troubled lands in later centuries. Both bells invited an enemy to attack." In this vein, to 
focus on targets may be selecting those leaders who face domestic problems already, and 
are therefore more likely to respond with the use of force. This form of potential selection 
bias implies that he mean of the popularity variable should be a significant egative value, 
and the distribution fcases across the dependent variable should be skewed in favor a 
response involving the use of force. However, the mean of the indicator of popularity is
-0.004 (see footnote 18 for additional summary statistics), and the distribution fcases 
across the categories of the response variable is 49% and 51% for 0 and 1, respectively. 
Therefore, I do not believe that selection bias is a significant problem. 
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Relative capability is measured by calculating the percentage differ- 
ence in real gross domestic product between the target and the initiator. 
Although other measures have been used to assess relative capabili- 
ties, aggregate conomic indicators ( uch as gross national product) per- 
form reasonably well as indicators of overall capability (James 1987, 
589).1o 
Leader popularity is perhaps the most difficult of all the variables to 
measure. Recent empirical research on the link between leader popularity 
and the diversionary use of force is limited to democratic systems (mainly, 
the United States). One reason for this limited spatial domain is the avail- 
ability of information the popularity of leaders across nations. For U.S. 
leaders, reliable survey data are available from the early postwar period 
to the present, allowing for detailed time series analyses. To evaluate the 
conditioning effects of regime type and policy resources on the relationship 
between leader popularity and the diversionary use of force requires a much 
larger spatial domain. The primary difficulty is developing an indicator of 
popularity inthe absence of direct survey data. I use economic-policy out- 
comes to assess the popularity ofleaders. While one can imagine alternative 
measures, economic-policy outcomes are difficult for governments to hide 
and relatively easy for individuals to evaluate. Economic-policy failures 
are felt directly through igher prices, higher unemployment, and a lower 
standard of living. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests a relatively 
strong link between economic-policy outcomes and leader popularity inthe 
United States (Brace and Hinckley 1992; Beck 1991; Norpoth 1991; Hibbs 
1982; Ostrom and Simon 1985), West Germany (Kirchgassner 1991), 
France (Lafay 1991), and Great Britain (Norpoth 1991). 
One concern may be the extent o which the domestic support for au- 
thoritarian regimes is affected by changes in economic onditions. After 
evaluating the effect of a one-year lag of the difference inannual growth 
rates of per capita real gross domestic product on the incidence of coups 
'"As a test of the validity of using real gross domestic product as an indicator of power, 
I estimated a probit model to evaluate the ability of this indicator to predict he power status 
(major-minor power) of the targets and initiators involved in disputes between 1950 and 
1976. The percentage of states correctly classified is 95.6% (N = 483) and 94.0% (N = 
473), respectively. 
I also investigated the possible ffects of allies on target decisions. To this end, I esti- 
mated models that included four alliance measures: the number of major power allies on 
the side of the target and the initiator; and the total number of allies on the side of the 
initiator and the target. Of these four variables, only the number of major power allies on 
the side of the initiator was statistically significant. More importantly, alliance membership 
had no substantive effect on the estimate for leader popularity inany of the models presented 
below. 
DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND THE DIVERSIONARY USE OF FORCE 771 
for 121 countries from 1950 to 1982, Londregan and Poole (1990 178, 
emphasis added) conclude: 
The coup-inhibiting effect of income is dramatic. For this reason, even 
authoritarian governments have powerful incentives to promote conomic 
growth, not out of concern for their citizens, but because failure to deliver 
adequate economic performance may lead to their downfall." 
Below, the popularity of leaders is indicated by the difference between the 
growth rate of per capita real gross domestic product in the year before the 
dispute (t-1) and the average growth rate of per capita real gross domestic 
product during the previous five years (t-6 to t-2).'2 I focus on changes in 
growth rates in order to have a baseline against which to judge the perfor- 
mance of leaders (Summer and Heston 1988).'3 Levels of policy resources 
can be indicated by a number of factors. I use the structure of the govern- 
ment's revenue base-the proportion of total central government revenue 
derived from direct taxes-to indicate levels of policy resources (United 
Nations Statistical Yearbook)."4 Although governments use a variety of 
methods to raise revenue, generally there are two types: revenue bases that 
primarily consist of taxes on imports and exports, and those that tend to 
rely on direct taxes. 
Import and export taxes are relatively easy to implement. This path of 
least resistance is attractive to governments because it allows them to ex- 
tract resources from society with minimal effort. Simplicity, however, is 
purchased at the price of security. Import and export taxes are based on 
the sale or purchase of commodities and are influenced by the supply and 
demand for those commodities. The amount of revenue generated in any 
given year is therefore sensitive to economic shocks at home and abroad. 
This not only translates into a less secure revenue base, it also means less 
"I do not wish to imply that changing economic onditions affect all leaders in an 
identical manner. It is reasonable to argue, for example, that he popularity levels of authori- 
tarian leaders in socialist countries may be affected to a lesser degree than the popularity 
levels of leaders in capitalist democracies. This, I believe, is a valid criticism of the indicator. 
Nevertheless, I am unaware of an alternative indicator of leader popularity that is superior 
to the one used here. 
'21f the dispute occurred by September 1or later, I used the growth rate for that year. 
If it occurred prior to this date, I used the growth rate for the prior year. 
'3Analyses were also done using an indicator based on the first difference ofgrowth 
rates. Substantively, the results were virtually identical to those using the five year average 
as the baseline. 
"To make the measure comparable temporally and spatially, itwas necessary to include 
the following in the measure of direct axes: social security contributions, property taxes, 
and death taxes. 
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manipulative capability during times of need. The price of most commodities 
is elastic (and for many of them substitutes exist), and increasing the amount 
of the tax on the commodity will only result in a decrease in demand. 
Direct axes provide a more manipulable, more secure base of revenue. 
Unlike taxes on exports and imports, direct axes can be increased without 
a concomitant decrease in the number of units being taxed. Furthermore, 
leaders can use direct-tax policies to reward supporters and punish political 
rivals by altering the rate at which segments of society are taxed. Import 
and export axes do not offer this flexibility: they can be decreased rela- 
tively easily, but increasing them has little ffect on overall evels of reve- 
nue if the demand for the commodity is price-elastic. Inaddition, countries 
that have developed the bureaucracy necessary for a revenue base relying 
on direct axes are likely to have other policies at their disposal, such as 
unemployment i surance and welfare programs. Unemployment i surance 
and welfare programs help mitigate the effects of changing economic on- 
ditions on leaders' popularity levels. During periods of economic recession 
leaders can extend unemployment i surance coverage or expand welfare 
benefits to reduce the burden on society. This has two effects: it improves 
the living conditions of unemployed workers, and it stimulates the econ- 
omy, thereby helping the nation to recover from the recession."5 
Level of autocracy is drawn from the Polity II data set (Gurr, Jaggers, 
and Moore 1989).16 The indicator is an additive, weighted 11-point scale 
with 0 representing the lowest level of autocracy and 10 representing the 
highest level of autocracy. In Polity II, autocracy is defined as the degree 
to which state political institutions restrict or suppress competitive political 
participation. Five indicators are used to construct the scale: the competi- 
tiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the open- 
ness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the 
chief executive (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989, 37).17 
The data set covers 294 militarized interstate disputes between 1955 
and 1976 for which data were available. The spatial domain includes 58 
'5To evaluate the relationship between the revenue base and the probability hat a state 
has in place an unemployment-insurance program, I used the the indicator of policy resources 
to predict whether a nation had an unemployment i surance program in place at the time 
of the dispute (United States Department ofHealth and Human Services 1983). The probit 
model correctly classifies 88.7% of the nations involved in disputes between 1952 and 1976 
(N = 428). 
16I am most grateful to Kevin Wang and James Ray for providing the Polity II data. 
"7The Polity II Data set also includes ameasure of democracy, which is highly correlated 
with autocracy (.85). To ensure comparability, models were also estimated substituting the 
measure of democracy for the measure of autocracy. The results were virtually identical. 
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Table 1. Probit Coefficients for the Basic and Constrained Models 
(Coefficients [t-Ratios]) 
Basic Policy Resources Autocracy Level 
Model Low High Low High 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Initiator hostility 0.53* 0.67* -0.18 0.33* 0.91* 
level (5.24) (5.69) (0.09) (2.66) (4.33) 
Target capability -0.84* -0.81* 0.24 -0.30 -1.48* 
(2.35) (2.00) (0.24) (0.64) (2.26) 
Leader popularity -3.00* -3.50* 5.46 -1.58 -4.94* 
(2.16) (2.31) (1.11) (0.92) (2.15) 
Level of autocracy -0.01 -0.02 0.08 
(0.35) (0.78) (0.31) 
Level of policy -0.85* --1.34* 1.21 
resources (2.08) (3.06) (0.98) 
Log likelihood -177.8 -135.7 -34.7 -107.3 -64.1 
N 294 228 66 175 119 
Chi-square 49.32* 44.40* 01.38 23.77* 36.80* 
% of cases correctly 70 70 77 70 75 
classified 
*Significant a p < .05 level using a two-tailed test. 
countries that were the targets of a threat, display, or use of force by another 
nation-state.18 
Analysis 
Table 1 presents estimates from a multivariate probit analysis (Aldrich 
and Nelson 1984). Hypothesis 1is strongly supported by the evidence: the 
coefficient for the level of hostility of the initiator is significant beyond 
the p < .05 level and the sign of the coefficient is positive, meaning that 
the higher the level of hostility of the initiator, the greater the probability 
'8Summary statistics and the correlation matrix for the independent variables are as 
follows: 
Std. 
Variable Mean Deviation Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 
1. hostility level 3.63 0.84 1 5 1. 1.00 
2. relative capability 0.00 0.23 -.88 .46 2. 0.02 1.00 
3. leader popularity 0.00 0.06 -.40 .20 3. 0.04 -0.06 1.00 
4. -policy resources 0.31 0.24 .04 .91 4. -0.04 0.33 0.01 1.00 
5. autocracy level 3.39 3.46 0 10 5. -0.01 -0.15 0.00 -0.55 1.00 
(N = 294) (N = 294) 
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that he target responds with force. The coefficient for the relative capability 
of the target is also statistically significant. The negative sign offers ome 
support for Hypothesis 3, that power preponderance leads to peace. To 
make any firm judgements about the hypothesis, however, requires a disag- 
gregation of the effects of relative capability (see Table 2 below). The re- 
sults for leader popularity provide support for Hypothesis 4. The estimates 
in column 1 point o a negative relationship between leader popularity and 
target response, with the effects of the systemic and other domestic factors 
controlled. The sign of the coefficient estimate suggests that he lower the 
popularity of leaders, the more likely they are to respond with force.'9 
What is the relative importance of each variable in predicting whether 
or not a leader responds with force? One way to assess the relative contribu- 
tion of the key independent variables is to compute the proportionate reduc- 
tion of error obtained by adding each variable to the model (Goodman and 
Kruskal 1954).2? The level of hostility of the initiator dramatically improves 
the ability of the probit model to classify cases correctly. Its inclusion im- 
proves the model's performance byapproximately 40%. This provides ad- 
ditional evidence that reciprocity is a common feature of international poli- 
tics. In contrast, he contribution f relative capability to the model's ability 
to successfully classify cases is slight-only about 2%. Leader popularity 
improves the classification of cases by 8%. The modest contribution f
leader popularity to the explanatory power of the model provides upport 
for the arguments of Morgan and Bickers (1992, 28), that he diversionary 
hypothesis should be treated as a "partial explanation of some foreign pol- 
icy decisions," rather than "a universal dictum of state behavior." 
Following Nagler (1991), I employ a strategy for assessing the degree 
to which levels of policy resources and autocracy condition the effect of 
leader popularity on target response. Nagler suggests restricting the values 
of the independent variables and comparing the results of separate models 
estimated using these restricted samples. Accordingly, I estimate four mod- 
els, selecting the middle value of the indicators for levels of policy re- 
sources (.5) and level of autocracy (5) to evaluate their conditioning effects 
'9Level of policy resources has a negative, significant effect on the probability hat he 
target will respond with force. This implies that the lower the level of policy resources 
available to leaders, the higher the probability hat hey will respond with force. The conse- 
quences of this are not readily apparent, since levels of policy resources is included in the 
model to condition the effects of leader popularity on target response, and not for its indepen- 
dent effects on target response. 
20The proportionate reduction of error is calculated by dividing the difference b tween 
the prediction error that is obtained using a set of k variables and the prediction error using 
k + I variables by the prediction error from the original set of k variables. This provides 
a statistic that varies from 0 to 1. 
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on leader popularity. Inthe test of the indicator-representing levels of policy 
resources, I compare the effect of leader popularity on response for leaders 
with low levels of policy resources with the effect of leader popularity on 
target response for leaders who possess high levels of policy resources. A 
similar test is done comparing the effects of leader popularity on target 
response for leaders who face relatively low domestic political costs for 
the use of force with the responses of leaders who face relatively high 
domestic political costs for the use of force. If Hypothesis 2 is correct, 
leader popularity should have a much stronger negative ffect on the proba- 
bility that he target will respond with the use of force for leaders with low 
levels of policy resources than for leaders with relatively high levels of 
policy resources. Similarly, leader popularity should have a more pro- 
nounced negative ffect on leaders who face relatively low probabilities of
removal for policy failures than on leaders who face relatively high proba- 
bilities of removal for policy failure. Columns 2 to 5 in Table 1 report he 
estimates. 
The differences within the two sets of models are striking. The relation- 
ship between leader popularity and target response is much stronger intwo 
domestic ontexts: for leaders with low levels of policy resources (column 
2) and for leaders of more autocratic systems (column 5). Both of the condi- 
tional hypotheses (Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6) are supported by the 
results. In the first model, which estimates the effect of leader popularity 
on leaders with low levels of policy resources (column 2), the relationship 
between leader popularity and target response is negative and statistically 
significant. Comparing the results with the model presented in column 1, 
the size of the coefficient is much larger for the indicator of leader popular- 
ity. For leaders with high levels of policy resources (column 3), there is 
no systematic relationship between leader popularity and target response. 
Thus, the effect of changes in popularity on the probability that a leader 
will respond with force depends on the policy resources available to that 
leader. The last two columns in Table 1 (4 and 5) present he estimates of 
the models that evaluate the relationship between leader popularity and 
target response for domestic structures that are less autocratic and more 
autocratic, respectively. As expected, leader popularity has a stronger nega- 
tive effect on the probability that he target will respond with force in more 
autocratic states (column 5) than it does in less autocratic states (column 4).21 
The effects of the systemic variables also vary by domestic ontext, 
21ne objection to this analysis is that democratic leaders only use diversionary tactics 
on, or near, election times. To investigate his possibility, I analyzed all the disputes between 
1955 and 1976 involving France, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and the United States, and calculated the maximum number of months that remained until 
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although the results are not consistent. While there appears to be no system- 
atic difference inthe effect of the level of hostility of the initiator on target 
response across levels of autocracy, variations in levels of policy resources 
dramatically affect his relationship. Inthe original model, the relationship 
between the hostility of the initiator and target response was positive and 
significant well beyond the p < .01 level. However, the estimates in col- 
umns 2 and 3 indicate that he relationship only holds for leaders with low 
levels of policy resources. For leaders with an abundance of policy re- 
sources, the level of hostility of the initiator has no appreciable influence 
on their esponses. 
The effect of the relative capability of the target on the probability ofthe 
use of force is similarly affected by variations in domestic ontext. It has a 
significant effect in two contexts: on leaders with relatively low levels of 
policy resources and on leaders of more autocratic systems. On the other 
hand, leaders who possess high levels of policy resources and leaders of less 
autocratic systems appear to be relatively unaffected by relative capabilities. 
How much of a difference dothese factors make in the probability hat 
the target responds with force? Table 2 reports the shifts in the cumulative 
normal probability distribution across selected values of the three key ex- 
planatory variables for the basic and constrained models.22 The first five 
rows in Table 2 display the shifts in the cumulative normal probability by 
level of hostility for each of the models estimated in Table 1. Compared 
with the other two key independent variables (see below), the level of hos- 
tility of the initiator has the strongest, most consistent effect on the probabil- 
ity that he target responds with force. For the basic model (column 1), if 
an initiator threatens touse force, the probability hat he target will respond 
with force decreases by 28.4%. On the other hand, if the initiator uses force, 
the probability that the target reciprocates increases by 6.4%. Columns 2 
through 5 present he effects of initiator hostility on the probability of the 
use of force by domestic ontext. These estimates reflect he differences 
highlighted inthe discussion of Table 1. Specifically, the level of hostility 
of the initiator has a fairly consistent effect across three of the four domestic 
contexts. However, for leaders who possess high levels of policy resources 
elections would be held from the time of the dispute. I then reestimated the model for more 
democratic states controlling for the maximum number of months that remained until elec- 
tions would be held. The coefficient estimate for leader popularity was -1.74, with a t-ratio 
of 0.988 (N = 75). Although the negative sign is of greater magnitude than the coefficient 
obtained in the model presented in column 5, Table 1, it is much smaller than the coefficient 
estimate for the more autocratic states. Moreover, the t-ratio isfar from being significant a  
the p < .05 level using a two-tailed test. 
22Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, Appendix C) provide a discussion of this procedure. 
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Table 2. Changes in the Cumulative Normal Probability of the Use 
of Force for Key Explanatory Variables 
Basic Low Policy High Policy Low High 
Model Resources Resources Autocracy Autocracy 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Initiator's hostility level 
Low 
1 -.382 -.473 .014 -.268 -.480 
2 -.284 -.371 .009 -.183 -.415 
3 -.129 -.173 .003 -.079 -.218 
4 .064 .080 -.002 .038 .097 
5 .252 .298 -.007 .158 .362 
High 
Target's relative capability 
Initiator preponderant .055 .040 -.023 .019 .075 
Equal capabilities -.002 -.013 -.010 -.001 -.013 
Target preponderant -.051 -.059 .001 -.018 -.090 
Leader popularity 
Low level 
10th percentile .070 .079 -.097 .038 .098 
20th percentile .042 .048 -.064 .023 .058 
30th percentile .029 .033 -.047 .016 .038 
40th percentile .011 .013 -.023 .007 .013 
50th percentile .000 .000 -.006 .001 -.003 
60th percentile -.013 -.015 .015 -.006 -.023 
70th percentile -.022 -.026 .031 -.011 -.037 
80th percentile -.037 -.043 .056 -.019 -.059 
90th percentile -.065 -.077 .109 -.034 -.102 
High level 
(column 3), the level of hostility of the initiator has little, if any, effect on 
their foreign policy decisions. 
The estimates for relative capability presented in Table 2 fail to provide 
support for either the balance-of-power hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) or the 
power-preponderance hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). Contrary to the expecta- 
tions of both theories, when the initiator is preponderant, the probabil- 
ity that the target will respond with force increases by 5.5%. On the 
other hand, in disputes where the target is preponderant, the probability 
that he leader responds with force declines by 5. 1%. In addition, the mag- 
nitude and direction of these effects vary by domestic context. For 
leaders with high levels of policy resources, power preponderance in- 
creases the probability of the use of force by approximately one-tenth of 
one percent. In contrast, for more autocratic leaders, power preponderance 
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actually decreases the probability that they respond with force by about 
9%. 
The evaluation of the independent effects of different levels of leader 
popularity on the probability that a leader responds with force is based on 
selected percentiles of the indicator of popularity. The first column of Table 
2 presents the probit estimates for the basic model. For leaders at the tenth 
percentile (i.e., 90% of the other leaders have values that are greater), the 
probability ofthe use of force is 7% greater than it is for the baseline model. 
In contrast, for leaders at the ninetieth percentile, the probability of the 
use of force decreases by 6.5%. These estimates are consistent with the 
expectations of Hypothesis 4.
The estimates for the constrained models (columns 2 through 5) pro- 
vide a more nuanced presentation fthe conditioning effects of domestic 
structures. Comparing the estimates in columns 2 and 3 for leaders at the 
tenth percentile, we note that low levels of policy resources increase the 
probability that hey respond with force by approximately 8%. In contrast, 
leaders with high levels of policy resources are approximately 10% less 
likely to respond with force. 
The effect of domestic political structures onthe propensity ofleaders 
to employ diversionary tactics appears to be one of magnitude rather than 
sign. These are presented in columns 4 and 5. Looking again at leaders at 
the tenth percentile on the popularity scale, we note that leaders of less 
autocratic governments are about 4% more likely to use force, while leaders 
of more autocratic governments are about 10% more likely to use force. 
Moreover, the differences are consistent across levels of popularity. At high 
levels of popularity (ninetieth percentile), leaders are about 3% more likely 
to use force if they face relatively high political costs for the use of force. 
In contrast, leaders of more autocratic states tend to be about 10% less 
likely to use force when their popularity levels are high.23 
Conclusions 
The primary objective of this study was to specify and to evaluate the 
conditioning effects of domestic structures onthe propensity ofleaders to 
23The results reported in Table 1 and Table 2 may be the product of changes in sample 
size rather than a function of the independent variables. The analyses began with 294 cases, 
but the constrained models presented in Table 1 restrict the test to as few as 66 cases. To 
investigate he possible biasing effects of sample size on the coefficient estimates I estimated 
two sets of 25 models, one consisting of 25 randomly selected subsamples of 65 cases (based 
on the number of cases in column 3, Table 1), and the other set consisting of 25 randomly 
selected subsamples of 175 cases (based on the number of cases in column 4, Table 1). The 
results, reported in the Appendix, indicate that the effect of sample size on the estimates 
reported above are minimal. 
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use international conflict involvement tomanipulate domestic audiences. I 
argued above that the different results obtained by the initial and recent 
evaluations of diversionary theory were the product of specification error, 
and not simply a function of research design. Instead, the relationship be- 
tween leader popularity and the political use of force is conditioned by 
domestic structures. All three of the domestic-level hypotheses are sup- 
ported by the data. Controlling for domestic political institutions and the 
level of policy resources, there is a significant egative relationship between 
leader popularity and the probability ofthe use of force. Moreover, a com- 
parison of subsamples of the data supported both of the conditioning 
hypotheses: the lower the ability of society to remove a leader from power, 
the more likely the leader will be to abuse that power for personal gain; 
and the fewer the resources available to leaders to influence their domestic 
environment, the more likely they are to use foreign policy to pursue their 
political ambitions. 
The support for the system level hypotheses i mixed. While the level 
of hostility of the initiator has a strong, positive ffect on the response of the 
target, the estimates for the effect of relative capability are in the opposite 
direction predicted. Moreover, even the systemic variables are influenced 
by the domestic ontext in which the dispute took place. Leaders of states 
with low levels of policy resources are much more likely than leaders that 
enjoy higher levels of policy resources to respond to threats from abroad 
in kind. This provides additional evidence that domestic political arrange- 
ments act as a filter for the effects of the international system on foreign 
policies of states. 
More generally, the analyses presented here support he arguments of 
Rosenau (1969) and Putnam (1988) that he macro-micro division in inter- 
national relations is inappropriate, and that international politics is linkage 
politics. Leaders make foreign policy decisions based on a number of fac- 
tors-domestic and international-and an accurate xplanation of these 
decisions must take into account both levels of analysis. 
While the general implications of this analysis are encouraging, the 
empirical results uggest a lacuna. On the one hand, the results uggest 
that he responses of leaders to military threats from abroad are relatively 
unaffected by popularity levels if they face high domestic political costs 
for using force or if they possess an abundance of policy resources. On the 
other hand, Ostrom and Job (1986), James and Oneal (1991) and Morgan 
and Bickers (1992) find a strong relationship between presidential popular- 
ity and the political use of force. The United States is not only highly demo- 
cratic, its leaders also enjoy relatively high levels of policy resources. The 
differences between the findings of this tudy and others may be attributable 
to a number of factors, uch as the different measures of leader popularity, 
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or to the fact that previous studies looked at dispute initiation while this 
focuses on target responses in disputes. One useful direction for future re- 
search would be to examine both dispute initiation and target response for 
the United States using survey and economic indicators of popularity, and 
then compare the results. 
A second useful avenue of research is to explore in greater detail the 
composition of ruling coalitions across states. According to Morgan and 
Bickers (1992, 33), "we should expect a leader faced with a loss of support 
or domestic turmoil to deal with the problem differently ifthe challenge 
is from within the ruling coalition than if it comes from outside groups." 
In combination with information on the structure of domestic political insti- 
tutions and levels of policy resources, knowledge of the composition and 
interests of the ruling coalition will enhance our ability to explain foreign 
policy decisions. 
Manuscript submitted 2 March 1994. 
Final manuscript received 22 October 1994. 
APPENDIX A 
Evaluating the Robustness of the Constrained Models 
To investigate he possible biasing effects of sample size on the coefficient esti- 
mates I estimated two sets of 25 models, one consisting of 25 randomly selected 
subsamples of 65 cases (based on the number of cases in column 3, Table 1), 
and the other set consisting of 25 randomly selected subsamples of 175 cases 
(based on the number of cases in column 4, Table 1). If the results presented 
in Table I are a function of sample size, we should expect approximately one 
half of the 25 models using the smaller sample (N = 65) to report positive 
coefficients for the variable popularity, while the other coefficients should have 
negative signs. In the set of large samples (N = 175), if there is no conditioning 
effect of autocracy on the relationship between leader popularity and target re- 
sponse, we would expect one half of the models estimated to produce coeffi- 
cients which are smaller in magnitude than the one reported in Table 1, column 
4, and the other half should be greater in size. The estimates for the leader 
popularity coefficients are reported below. 
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Coefficient Estimates for the Small and Large Subsamples 
Small sample (N = 65) Large sample (N = 175) 
Leader Popularity Leader Popularity 
Coefficient ( -value) Coefficient ( -value) 
1. -1.06 (0.37) 14. -6.07 (1.70) 1. -2.12 (1.25) 14. -2.74 (1.72) 
2. -10.83* (2.30) 15. -4.49 (1.32) 2. -3.33* (2.00) 15. -3.62* (2.16) 
3. -6.13 (1.62) 16. -4.37 (1.18) 3. -0.19 (0.14) 16. -0.82 (0.57) 
4. -0.99 (0.03) 17. -7.36* (2.23) 4. -0.49 (0.33) 17. -3.17 (1.90) 
5. -3.27 (1.02) 18. -1.06 (0.37) 5. -3.08 (1.90) 18. -4.34* (2.52) 
6. -2.86 (0.90) 19. -10.83* (2.30) 6. -1.58 (0.95) 19. -3.50* (2.23) 
7. -2.80 (1.11) 20. -5.45 (1.66) 7. -2.24 (1.56) 20. -2.10 (1.26) 
8. -10.33* (2.41) 21. -1.55 (0.65) 8. -3.48* (2.23) 21. -2.75 (1.75) 
9. -2.45 (0.55) 22. -1.00 (0.33) 9. -2.38 (1.65) 22. -2.62 (1.56) 
10. -10.99 (2.74) 23. -0.59 (0.17) 10. -3.31* (2.04) 23. -2.31 (1.42) 
11. -5.44 (1.74) 24. -8.78* (2.19) 11. -2.21 (1.51) 24. -2.79 (1.77) 
12. -1.73 (0.53) 25. -2.73 (0.80) 12. -3.73* (2.33) 25. -3.41* (2.07) 
13. -3.89 (1.45) 13. -3.34* (2.06) 
*significant at p < .05 using a two-tailed test 
Comparing the coefficients in columns 1 and 2 above with the results in columns 
3 and 4 in Table 1, we note that none of the former is positive, suggesting that 
the conclusions drawn from Table 1 regarding the conditioning effects of levels 
of policy resources and autocracy are reasonably robust. If the results for coun- 
tries with high levels of policy resources and low levels of autocracy are due 
to sample size, we should find positive coefficients in about one-half of the 
models in columns 1 and 2 above. Looking at the coefficients ofthe indicator 
of leader popularity for the larger sample (column 4, Table 1) compared with 
the results presented in columns 3 and 4 above, the results are not as strong, 
however they still provide support for the hypothesis. True, three out of the 25 
models have coefficients which are smaller in size than the coefficients reported 
in Table 1. Moreover, one of the coefficients is similar in size, although slightly 
greater. However, the remaining coefficients for the variable of leader popularity 
all exceed the size of the coefficient reported in Table 1, column 5. Thus, while 
it is possible that he results are a function of sample size, the probability that 
this is in fact the case is rather low. 
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